In the Image of God: A Dialogue With a Roman Catholic Apologist on the Veneration of Images

Robert Sungenis of Catholic Apologetics International has recently written an article in response to portions of my book, Evangelical Answers. In particular, he has addressed the views of the patristic writers that I have stated are in opposition to the use of religious images as an acceptable practice for Christians. Sungenis quotes from my book (in red), and responds (in blue). I will in turn respond to his comments (in black).

Svendsen: p. 196: "Clearly, the Scriptures consider bowing before images an act of worship."

R. Sungenis: No, Scripture considers bowing before an image that represents God or false god as an act of worship. Worship can only be given to a divine being, whether actual or presupposed divinity.

For some odd reason Sungenis has opted not to cite the passage in Exodus—on which I based the comments in my book—which expressly forbids us to bow down before religious statues:

“You shall not make for yourself an idol in the form of anything in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the waters below. You shall not bow down to them or worship them; for I, the LORD your God, am a jealous God” (Exod 20:4-5).

Sungenis has not explained this passage. The passage does not indicate that it is acceptable before God to bow down to an image so long as it does not represent deity and you do not consider it deity. Rather, it states unequivocally not to make an image of “anything,” in heaven or on earth, with the purpose of “bowing down” to it. Indeed, the very point of the passage is that God alone is to receive this kind of honor (more on this later).

Both the Hebrew (pesel) and the Greek LXX  (eidōlon) simply mean “image.” This could be of a false god (idol), but neither the word itself nor the context of Exodus 20 limits it to that application. The word translated “anything” (Gr., pantos, “all”; Heb., kol, “the whole of”) is categorical. In Hebrew, kol is used to signify “the entire class” (BDB), and with the negative, “none in the entire class.” The LXX borrows the Hebrew idiom by using pantos with the negative. It is a categorical prohibition against bowing down to any and all religious images. It allows for no exceptions.

Svendsen: p. 197: "in Clement's view, because God did not want us to 'cling to things of sense...'"

R. Sungenis: But that is true of any physical object or activity. Eating too much can make one "cling to the things of sense."

Except, of course, that is not what Clement of Alexandria says. Here is the quotation that Sungenis fails to address:

“The Law itself exhibits justice. It teaches wisdom by abstinence from visible images and by inviting us to the Maker and Father of the universe” (Stromata, Book II,  XVIII).

“[because God does not want us to] cling to things of sense. . . . For familiarity with the sense of sight disparages the reverence of what is divine” (ibid., Book V, V.).

Sungenis responds to this as though he has a quarrel with me, when in reality he has a quarrel with Clement. But that is just the point; that the modern views of the Roman Catholic differ with the views of the fathers.

Svendsen: p. 198: "While it is true that Origin [sic] is specifically referring to images of 'gods,' and not specifically the saints, no one who makes such statements can at the same time assume that images may legitimately be used in the religious practice of venerating the saints."

R. Sungenis: Then why did Solomon make two sculptured cherubim (angels) in the holy of holies and overlay them with gold? (The cherubim's wing span was 10 yards wide). Obviously, Scripture is making the distinction between an image of God (or a god) and the image of a non-God. Also, Scripture's continued prohibition of using gold and silver and art is strictly in reference to God, not non-Gods (Acts 17:29).

First, a disclaimer. Sungenis has apparently procured a pre-publication copy of my book as is evidenced from his use of the [sic] after Origin (those kinds of typos were corrected before publication through Reformation Press). Since he apparently does not have a copy of my published work, it makes me wonder whether he has read the revisions to some of my earlier arguments.

Unfortunately, Sungenis once again opts to argue with the patristic writer vicariously through me.

Sungenis continues by quoting Origen's Against Celsus 7, 4-5, and then concludes, “Obviously, Origen is speaking only about images to God or a false god, not to non-gods.” Yes, this is obvious; and this is a point that I fully acknowledge in my book. Yet what is equally obvious is that Sungenis completely misses the point. Origen bases his statements on clear assumptions that would certainly disallow venerating images of any kind. Note carefully what Origen says:

“The Scythians, the nomadic Libyans, the godless Seres, and the Persians agree in this [rejection of images] with the Christians and Jews. However, they are actuated by very different principles.”

Origen indicates that there is an underlying principle that precludes Christians and Jews from the use of images.  What is that principle?

“For none of these other groups abhor altars and images on the ground that they are afraid of degrading the worship of God and reducing it to the worship of material things.”

In other words, to reduce worship to material things is to degrade worship. Origen is, of course, speaking of the worship of God. But it is not so much his application that is of concern here as the “principle that actuates” that application. It is inconceivable that someone operating on a principle that precludes the use of images in worship could simultaneously use images in the veneration of the saints. If the use of material images degrades worship, how does it not likewise degrade veneration?

Moreover, even though it goes without saying that Sungenis, as a Roman Catholic, will argue that veneration of the saints is not worship, such a claim is simply gratuitous. What is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied. That, in fact, is just the point under discussion in that section of my book. I maintain that bowing down to, praying to, and kissing the feet of any image is indeed an act of worship.

At the end of the day, Sungenis has not demonstrated that Roman Catholics have escaped the implications of Origen’s words. Does Sungenis wish to limit the application of Origen’s words to images of God, even though Origen makes it clear that it is the underlying principle rather than the application of that principle that is important here (hence, his distancing from “the Scythians, the nomadic Libyans, the godless Seres, and the Persians,” who likewise reject images, but are “actuated by very different principles”)? Very well. Then let’s apply Sungenis’ understanding of this to the true God. Is Sungenis now ready to cease praying to, bowing down to, and kissing crucifixes, statues, and pictures of Jesus? Surely Sungenis will not want to argue that these things are outside of Origen’s own application. Jesus is God. Other members of Sungenis’ apologetic staff have gone on record arguing in favor of the marian title “mother of God” on the basis that Jesus is a divine person with a human nature, and not a person with two natures. On that same basis, therefore, to venerate or worship an image of Jesus is to venerate or worship an image of God. Hence, Sungenis has still not escaped the ramifications of Origen’s underlying principle.

One final statement from Origen that Sungenis fails to address is this:

“It is not possible at the same time to know God and to address prayers to images.”

Once again, Origen has in mind images of deity. Yet what is so striking about this statement is the underlying assumptions that must have been held by the writer to compose it. Is this a statement that any Roman Catholic could make without endless qualifications? Yet Origen gives us no qualifications. It is simply not possible that someone who makes this statement can simultaneously believe that it is “good and useful” to address prayers to images of saints.

Origen goes to great lengths to defend the “conduct of the Christians in refusing homage to any object except the Most High God, and the First-Born of all creation” (Ibid., LXX). His refusal to venerate images is based on the fact that Christians had “learned from Jesus Christ the true way of serving God. And we shrink from [images which], under a pretense of piety, leads to utter impiety” (Ibid., Book VIII, XX). Again, these are statement that no Roman Catholic could possibly make without endless qualifications. Yet Origen does not qualify them. Such unqualified statements assume a religious paradigm that is utterly inconsistent with modern Roman Catholicism.

Now to Sungenis’ specific statements regarding Solomon:

“Then why did Solomon make two sculptured cherubim (angels) in the holy of holies and overlay them with gold? (The cherubim's wing span [sic] was 10 yards wide). Obviously, Scripture is making the distinction between an image of God (or a god) and the image of a non-God.

Did Solomon or any of the Israelites bow down and pray to these images? Obviously not. Scripture indeed makes a distinction, but it is not the distinction that Sungenis thinks. The distinction is rather between making a religious image, and making a religious image with the purpose of bowing down to that image. Scripture never commends the latter; yet this is exactly what Roman Catholics do with their images.

Sungenis continues: “Also, Scripture's continued prohibition of using gold and silver and art is strictly in reference to God, not non-Gods (Acts 17:29).”

I confess, I do not know how Sungenis thinks Paul’s condemnation of images of deity somehow vindicates images of saints. This is a non-sequitur. Moreover, it completely ignores Paul’s doubtless appeal to Exod 20:4-5 as the basis of his objection, which we have already shown precludes “bowing down to” any and all images as a category.

Svendsen: p. 199: "Yet, according to several of the early fathers, this was the same line of reasoning used by the pagans, and one which the fathers categorically rejected. This is well illustrated by a statement from Athenagoras"

R. Sungenis: Athenagoras is speaking about the same thing Origen is, because they both are concerned with images to false gods or to God, not to non-gods. This is made clear in his quote, especially in the last line:

Sungenis goes on to quote the same passage from Athenagoras that I provide in my book, and once again misses the point entirely. The point made in the book is that Trent’s claim that the Roman Catholic believer is not venerating the image but rather what the image represents is precisely the same reasoning that Athenagoras says was used by pagans to justify their use of images. Here is Trent:

“[not] that trust is to be reposed in images, as was of old done by the Gentiles who placed their hope in idols; but because the honor which is shown them is referred to the prototypes which those images represent; in such wise that by the images which we kiss, and before which we uncover the head, and prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ; and we venerate the saints, whose similitude they bear” (Council of Trent, Session XXV).

 Yet, according to Athenagoras, this was the same line of reasoning used by the pagans, and one that he categorically rejects:

 “It is asserted by some [pagans] that, although these are only images, yet there exist gods in honor of whom they are made. They say that the prayers and sacrifices presented to the images are to be referred to the gods, and are in fact made to the gods” (Apology [To the Emperors Marcus Aurelius Anoninus and Lucius Aurelius Commodus], XVIII).

 Athenagoras later tells us that he is not raising this point to indict the pagans but rather to provide justification for the Christian rejection of images:

 “And I would beseech you, greatest of emperors, before I enter on this discussion, to be indulgent to me while I bring forward true considerations; for it is not my design to show the fallacy of idols, but, by disproving the calumnies vented against us, to offer a reason for the course of life we follow” (ibid.).

 Athenagoras writes to defend the course of life “we” follow (as distinct from the pagans), and to refute the accusations against “us.” Clearly, Athenagoras is speaking categorically for all Christians in his day, and he tells us that the singular Christian practice is to reject visible images.

Svendsen: p. 200: "Similarly, Arnobius, quoting his opponents, reiterates, and then rejects, the argument used by the pagans to justify the use of images."

R. Sungenis: Arnobius is speaking about the same as the previous Fathers. He is concerned with making images to false gods. We will notice throughout Arnobius' writings that he has no condemnation for Christians who make images of saints. (See more answer below).

Sungenis goes on to quote the same passage in Arnobius that I provide in my book, subtly suggesting that because Arnobius does not specify veneration of the images of saints (how could he, since that practice did not exist in his day?), he thereby “has no condemnation for Christians who make images of saints.” Is this accurate? Let’s read on and see.

Svendsen: p. 200: "The arguments used by Arnobius' opponents are strikingly similar to those used by Trent and Catholic apologists as a whole. Both attempt to justify their practice by claiming that to venerate the image is in reality to venerate the person represented by the image. Arnobius flatly denies that this is possible."

R. Sungenis: No, Arnobius' argument is that the pagans cannot make the excuse that the image is good because it curtails evil by putting fear into the hearts of people, since it was obvious in his day that the people were as wicked with images of false gods in their midst as they were when the images were not there. That certainly isn't the rationale of Trent. Arnobius and Trent are speaking about two different things.

What Sungenis does not inform the reader is that my comments above, which he excerpts from my book, do not immediately follow the quotation he provides from Arnobius. Between that passage from Arnobius and my ensuing comments is another passage from Arnobius that Sungenis fails to cite:

“‘But you err,’ says my opponent, ‘and are mistaken. For we do not consider either copper, gold, silver, or those other materials of which statues are made to be in themselves gods and sacred deities. Rather, in them we worship and venerate those beings whom their dedication as sacred items cause to dwell in those statues made by workmen.’”

This is the intervening passage I was responding to when I wrote the following:

“The arguments used by Arnobius' opponents are strikingly similar to those used by Trent and Catholic apologists as a whole. Both attempt to justify their practice by claiming that to venerate the image is in reality to venerate the person represented by the image. Arnobius flatly denies that this is possible."

I can only speculate as to why Sungenis misrepresents me here. The full-orbed Arnobius reveals quite clearly that he condemns the rationale that Trent eventually adopted in its justification for the veneration of images. Perhaps if Sungenis had responded to this, rather than to a straw man, we might have seen what the Roman Catholic answer to Arnobius looks like.

Sungenis informs us of the following at the end of his article: “I did not address Lanctantius because the explanation is the same for him as it is for Arnobius and Athenagoras.” Just so the reader knows what Lactantius says, here is one of the passages Sungenis deemed unworthy of comment:

 “What madness is it, then, either to form those objects that they themselves may afterwards fear, or to fear the things that they have formed? However, they say, 'We do not fear the images themselves, but those beings after whose likeness they were formed, and to whose names they are dedicated.' No doubt you fear them for this reason: because you think that they are in heaven” (The Divine Institutes, Book II, II).

 Once again, the rationale of the pagans in regard to images is precisely that proffered by Trent. They were not really venerating images, but rather what those images represented. As with Origen, Lactantius is here thinking about images of gods and not specifically saints (which, by the way, I freely acknowledge in my book); however, this is not surprising when we consider that the invocation of saints was completely unheard of in the primitive church. Yet the rational—or, as Origen calls it, the “principles”—that Lactantius gives here applies equally to images of saints:

 “So why, then [since you think that they are in heaven], do you not raise your eyes to heaven? Why do you not invoke their names and offer sacrifices in the open air? Why do you look to walls, wood, and stone—rather than to the place where you believe them to be? What is the meaning of temples and altars? What, in short, is the meaning of the images themselves, which are memorials either of the dead or of the absent?” (Ibid.).

Similar questions may be asked of Roman Catholics in regard to veneration of the images of saints: “So why, then [since you think that they are in heaven], do you not raise your eyes to heaven? Why do you not invoke their names . . . in the open air? Why do you look to walls, wood, and stone—rather than to the place where you believe them to be? What, in short, is the meaning of the images themselves, which are memorials either of the dead or of the absent?”

Again, it is the underlying assumptions upon which Lactantius bases his words that so completely militates against both the Roman Catholic practice and Sungenis’ defense of it. No one who in this way questions the rationale of pagans in venerating images can at the same time be involved in venerating images of his own. Does Sungenis consider Lactantius so dense as to be completely unaware that his charge against the pagans could be turned against him—if indeed he believed in veneration of images of the saints? Could not the pagans simply have responded: “So why, then [since you think that the saints are in heaven], do you not raise your eyes to heaven? Why do you not invoke their names . . . in the open air? Why do you look to walls, wood, and stone—rather than to the place where you believe them to be? What, in short, is the meaning of your images, which are memorials either of the dead or of the absent?” Given Sungenis’ assumption that Lactantius would have (or did) accept as valid the veneration of images of the saints, Lactantius’ charges are rendered baseless. Let’s continue.

Svendsen: p. 202: As with the other fathers cited above, Irenaeus' statement betrays a categorical rejection of the use of images for religious purposes. He observes the Gnostics from a distance and notes that 'they' possess images, and that 'they' maintain a legend about an image of Christ made by Pilate. 'They' honor these images they [sic] same way the Gentiles honor their pagan images. No one who speaks this way can at the same time entertain a legitimate Christian use of images. Indeed, it was the heretical Gnostics (not Irenaeus and orthodoxy) that set up and venerated the image of Christ - a decidedly Christian image. It would require very little imagination to conjecture what Irenaeus' response would be to the Catholic crucifix."

R. Sungenis: Irenaeus is saying just the opposite of what Svendsen is claiming. Irenaeus is not saying that images themselves are evil. From the remaining context of Against Heresies (chapters 20-26), and even in this context, he is saying that it is a contradiction for groups such as the Gnostics, who deny almost every doctrine of Christ and Christianity, to be carrying an image of Christ from Pilate. Why carry an image of Christ if you deny everything that He taught?

Is this really what Irenaeus is saying? Sungenis provides the same quotation that I provide in my book, and which reads as follows:

“[They] call themselves Gnostics. They also possess images, some of them painted, and others formed from different kinds of material. They maintain that a likeness of Christ was made by Pilate at that time when Jesus lived among them. They crown these images, and set them up along with the images of the philosophers of the world. That is to say, they place them with the images of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the rest. They have also other modes of honoring these images, after the same manner of the Gentiles” (Against Heresies, Book I, XXV.6).

There is absolutely nothing in the context of this passage to lend credence to Sungenis’ suggestion that what Irenaeus really means is, “it is a contradiction for groups such as the Gnostics, who deny almost every doctrine of Christ and Christianity, to be carrying an image of Christ from Pilate.” Far from it. The Gnostics had a doctrine of Christ, as the following passages show:

“They also hold that Jesus was the son of Joseph, and was just like other men, with the exception that he differed from them in this respect, that inasmuch as his soul was stedfast and pure, he perfectly remembered those things which he had witnessed within the sphere of the unbegotten God” (XXV.1). 

“This idea has raised them to such a pitch of pride, that some of them declare themselves similar to Jesus” (ibid.2)

“And in their writings we read as follows, the interpretation which they give [of their views], declaring that Jesus spoke in a mystery to His disciples and apostles privately, and that they requested and obtained permission to hand down the things thus taught them, to others who should be worthy and believing” (ibid.5).

It would be absolutely no contradiction to their views to set up an image of Christ. Sungenis ignores the immediate context and simply speculates (based on the Gnostic’s inaccuracies regarding Christ) that this is what Irenaeus must have meant. Yet, again, such an assertion is simply gratuitous.

Moreover, Sungenis ignores the “they hold” language used throughout this chapter, indicating what the Gnostics believed as opposed to Christians:

V.1: “his followers maintain that the world and the things which are therein were created by angels greatly inferior to the unbegotten Father.”

V.1: “They also hold that Jesus was the son of Joseph, and was just like other men, with the exception that he differed from them in this respect, that inasmuch as his soul was stedfast and pure, he perfectly remembered those things which he had witnessed within the sphere of the unbegotten God.”

V. 1: “and they say that it, after passing through them all, and remaining in all points free, ascended again to him.”

V. 1: “They further declare, that the soul of Jesus, although educated in the practices of the Jews, regarded these with contempt.”

V. 2: “some of them declare themselves similar to Jesus.”

V. 2: “others, still more mighty, maintain that they are superior to his disciples.”

V. 3: “They practice also magical arts and incantations; philters, also, and love-potions; and have recourse to familiar spirits, dream-sending demons, and other abominations,

V. 3: “[they] declare that they possess power to rule over, even now, the princes and formers of this world; and not only them, but also all things that are in it.”

V. 3: “they lead a licentious life.”

V. 3: “they abuse the name [of Christ], as a means of hiding their wickedness”

V. 4: “So unbridled is their madness, that they declare they have in their power all things which are irreligious and impious, and are at liberty to practice them.”

V. 4: “they maintain that things are evil or good, simply in virtue of human opinion.”

V. 4: “They deem it necessary, therefore, that by means of transmigration from body to body, souls should have experience of every kind of life as well as every kind of action.”

V. 4: “their writings express that their souls, having made trial of every kind of life [in licentious behavior], may, at their departure, not be wanting in any particular.”

V. 4: “They affirm that for this reason Jesus spoke the following parable” [followed by an interpretation to which Irenaeus clearly objects].

V. 4: “They also declare the "adversary" is one of those angels who are in the world, whom they call the Devil, maintaining that he was formed for this purpose, that he might lead those souls which have perished from the world to the Supreme Ruler.”

V. 4: “They describe him also as being chief among the makers of the world, and maintain that he delivers such souls [as have been mentioned] to another angel, who ministers to him, that he may shut them up in other bodies; for they declare that the body is ‘the prison.’”

V. 4: “they interpret these expressions . . . . as meaning that no one can escape from the power of those angels who made the world, but that he must pass from body to body”

V. 5: “And in their writings we read as follows, the interpretation which they give [of their views], declaring that Jesus spoke in a mystery to His disciples and apostles privately, and that they requested and obtained permission to hand down the things thus taught them, to others who should be worthy and believing.”

V. 6: “Others of them employ outward marks, branding their disciples inside the lobe of the right ear.”

V. 6: “They style themselves Gnostics.”

V. 6: “They also possess images, some of them painted, and others formed from different kinds of material.”

V. 6: “they maintain that a likeness of Christ was made by Pilate at that time when Jesus lived among them.”

V. 6: “They crown these images, and set them up along with the images of the philosophers of the world that is to say, with the images of Pythagoras, and Plato, and Aristotle, and the rest.”

V. 6: “They have also other modes of honoring these images, after the same manner of the Gentiles.”

It seems superfluous to mention that Irenaeus’ obvious point here is that, among these things, there is not even one common belief with true Christianity. If Sungenis’ point is maintained, we could then make the same case for every one of the other beliefs Irenaeus insists “they hold.” Perhaps Sungenis wishes to suggest that Irenaeus really doesn’t condemn the Gnostic practice of “magical arts, incantations, philters, love-potions, familiar spirits, and dream-sending demons”; he just sees them as inconsistent with their rejection of the doctrines of Christ. He doesn’t really intend to condemn their belief that “the world and the things which are therein were created by angels”; only that it is inconsistent with their rejection of the doctrines of Christ. He doesn’t really condemn the Gnostic practice of “irreligious and impious” acts; only that they are inconsistent with their rejection of the doctrines of Christ.

Sungenis’ odd statement, “Why carry an image of Christ if you deny everything that He taught?,” raises serious doubts in my mind that Sungenis could have given much thought to his answer. I hesitate to believe that Sungenis, who has received formal training in these things, is that unfamiliar with the tenets of Gnosticism. I will extend to him the benefit of the doubt that he simply raced through his response. The Gnostics didn’t reject anything Christ taught; they simply had their own interpretation of it. Irenaeus demonstrates that he understands this much about Gnostic belief when he mentions their interpretation of Jesus’ parables. Sungenis’ apparent lack of knowledge of Gnostic tenets raises even more doubts that he understands Irenaeus, who writes against these tenets.

Svendsen: p. 202: "Clement was so opposed to the use of images that he would not even allow that the images of the cherubim on top of the ark should be taken literally:

For He who prohibited the making of a graven image, would never Himself have made an image in the likeness of holy things. Nor is there at all any composite thing, and creature endowed with sensation, of the sort in heaven.

But the face is a symbol of the rational soul, and the wings are the lofty ministers and energies of powers right and left; and the voice is delightsome glory in ceaseless contemplation. Let it suffice that the mystic interpretation has advanced so far.

R. Sungenis: We don't take them literally either, for cherubim are spirits without bodies and wings. The cherubim merely represent the angels closest to God.

Sungenis once again misses the point. Just as Clement denies that God would have commanded the making of an image in the likeness of an angel (something in heaven), so also he would be opposed to making an image in the likeness of a saint (something in heaven). Moreover, Sungenis opts to ignore the more forceful statements from Clement provided in my book:

“It is with a different kind of spell that art deludes you. . . . It leads you to pay religious honor and worship to images and pictures” (Exhortation to the Heathen, IV). “Works of art cannot be sacred and divine” (Stromata, Book VII, V).

My point was simply that Clement’s view of images is radically different than the modern Roman Catholic view, nothing more. He opposed the use of images in art and pictures, and insisted that they cannot be “sacred”; Roman Catholicism insists otherwise.

Sungenis continues: “In fact, when the cherubim were set up and the temple completed, God came into the temple in the form of a cloud (2Chr 5:13-14). Thus, we have another representation of God made by God himself. The cloud was something to see.  If God did not intend them to have any visual aid due to prohibitions of the First and Second Commandments, then He wouldn't have come in a cloud, for He would have been making the people sin.”

Once again Sungenis misses the point. The prohibition is against “making” an image with the intent of “bowing down” to it. No one “made” the cloud in which the Shekinah glory appeared. God did not “cause the people to sin” in this any more than people would be sinning by looking at Jesus. God decides how He is represented. That’s the purpose of the prohibition. Man will always misrepresent God in his imaginations and speculations; and to the extent that man misrepresents Him, to that extend he engages in idolatry. That is why God may do things that he prohibits his creatures to do. A mother might instruct her child not to attempt cooking dinner, because that’s her job. She tells him this because she knows the child could never do it the way it needs to be done. If the child does it anyway, he has sinned against his mother. That doesn’t mean, however, that if she cooks the dinner she is equally guilty of sin; nor does it mean that if she allows the child to eat the meal she is somehow causing him to sin.

Sungenis continues: “Moreover, throughout his discourse on this subject, Clement is concerned that the Greeks and other pagan nations imitate and copy Christian symbols but put their own meanings to them. To combat this, Clement puts the proper meaning on the symbols, meaning that relates only to Christian truths. We can see this readily in the immediate context.”

It is unclear just what Sungenis means by “Christian symbols.” If he’s implying by this phrase that Clement sanctioned the use of images, then he is wrong. Clement does mention that the OT images were “symbols of Christ” (in the same way we can say the sacrifices of the OT were “symbols’ of Christ’s work); but he most certainly does not imply that Christians use images as “symbols” in worship. Indeed, that is the very premise that Clement denies.

Sungenis: "And then the remaining part [of the passage in Clement that Svendsen] does not quote:"

"But both together have twelve wings, and by the zodiac and time, which moves on it, point out the world of sense. It is of them, I think, that Tragedy, discoursing of Nature, says:

'Unwearied Time circles full in perennial flow, Producing itself. And the twin-bears On the swift wandering motions of their wings, Keep the Atlantean pole.'

And Atlas, the unsuffering pole, may mean the fixed sphere, or better perhaps, motionless eternity. But I think it better to regard the ark, so called from the Hebrew word Thebotha, as signifying something else. It is interpreted, one instead of one in all places. Whether, then, it is the eighth region and the world of thought, or God, all-embracing, and without shape, and invisible, that is indicated, we may for the present defer saying. But it signifies the repose which dwells with the adoring spirits, which are meant by the cherubim."

Sungenis quotes this without any comment of how the rest of the passage is relevant to the point he is making. What in this passage might overturn any of the points I have been making about Clement is beyond me. Until Sungenis clarifies, I have no further comment on it.

Svendsen: p. 203: "Similarly, Tertullian goes so far as to ascribe demonic activity to the veneration of images. We know that the names of the dead are nothing, as are their images; but we know well enough, too, who, when images are set up, under these names carry on their wicked work, and exult in the homage rendered to them, and pretend to be divine--none other than spirits accursed, than devils..."

R. Sungenis: The full paragraph of Svendsen's quote is noted below:

"These two evil spirits are in sworn confederacy with each other, as the patrons of drunkenness and lust. So the theater of Venus is as well the house of Bacchus: for they properly gave the name of Liberalia also to other theatrical amusements--which besides being consecrated to Bacchus (as were the Dionysia of the Greeks), were instituted by him; and, without doubt, the performances of the theater have the common patronage of these two deities. That immodesty of gesture and attire which so specially and peculiarly characterizes the stage are consecrated to them--the one deity wanton by her sex, the other by his drapery; while its services of voice, and song, and lute, and pipe, belong to Apollos, and Muses, and Minervas, and Mercuries. You will hate, O Christian, the things whose authors must be the objects of your utter detestation. So we would now make a remark about the arts of the theater, about the things also whose authors in the names we execrate. We know that the names of the dead are nothing, as are their images; but we know well enough, too, who, when images are set up, under these names carry on their wicked work, and exult in the homage rendered to them, and pretend to be divine--none other than spirits accursed, than devils. We see, therefore, that the arts also are consecrated to the service of the beings who dwell in the names of their founders; and that things cannot be held free from the taint of idolatry whose inventors have got a place among the gods for their discoveries. Nay, as regards the arts, we ought to have gone further back, and barred all further argument by the position that the demons, predetermining in their own interests from the first, among other evils of idolatry, the pollutions of the public shows, with the object of drawing man away from his Lord and binding him to their own service, carried out their purpose by bestowing on him the artistic gifts which the shows require. For none but themselves would have made provision and preparation for the objects they had in view; nor would they have given the arts to the world by any but those in whose names, and images, and histories they set up for their own ends the artifice of consecration."

We see that Tertullian is referring to the images of wicked pagans which are propped up on the theater walls of entertainment, images that invoke the wicked deeds of their deceased forebears. As such, he is condemning the theater arts of these pagans, and telling the Christians that the dead pagans who promoted these evils have no power in the present, even though their images are plastered all over the walls of the theater.

Svendsen also quotes from De Spectaculus ch 13:

"'Not that an idol is anything,' as the apostle says, but that the homage they render is to demons, who are the real occupants of these consecrated images, whether of dead men or (as they think) of gods."

Here is the full paragraph:

"We have, I think, faithfully carried out our plan of showing in how many different ways the sin of idolatry clings to the shows, in respect of their origins, their titles, their equipments, their places of celebration, their arts; and we may hold it as a thing beyond all doubt, that for us who have twice renounced all idols, they are utterly unsuitable. "Not that an idol is anything," as the apostle says, but that the homage they render is to demons, who are the real occupants of these consecrated images, whether of dead men or (as they think) of gods. On this account, therefore, because they have a common source--for their dead and their deities are one--we abstain from both idolatries. Nor do we dislike the temples less than the monuments: we have nothing to do with either altar, we adore neither image; we do not offer sacrifices to the gods, and we make no funeral oblations to the departed; nay, we do not partake of what is offered either in the one case or the other, for we cannot partake of God's feast and the feast of devils. If, then, we keep throat and belly free from such defilements, how much more do we withhold our nobler parts, our ears and eyes, from the idolatrous and funereal enjoyments, which are not passed through the body, but are digested in the very spirit and soul, whose purity, much more than that of our bodily organs, God has a right to claim from us."

Notice above the telling sentence: "On this account, therefore, because they have a common source--for their dead and their deities are one--we abstain from both idolatries." In other words, Tertullian's concern is that the "dead" and the "deities" are indistinguishable in the pagan mind, and as such, the Christian must condemn both. Again, we see that the issue is worship and praise to a false god. It is not with images of the deceased, per se.

It is exceedingly difficult to believe that Sungenis thinks quoting the entire paragraph has helped his case. Yes, it’s true (once again not surprisingly, since venerating images of saints was completely unheard of in the church of Tertullian’s day) that Tertullian is referring to pagan worship of pagan gods. So what? What, in the underlying assumptions that allow Tertullian to condemn this practice, would allow for a “Christianized” version of it? Notice what Tertullian says in the first passage above:

“We have, I think, faithfully carried out our plan of showing in how many different ways the sin of idolatry clings to the shows.”

Tertullian then proceeds to itemize each one of these "different ways": “their origins,” which is different from “their titles,” which is different from “their equipments,” which is different from “their places of celebration,” which is different from “their arts.”

Tertullian’s point is that each of these things is idolatry in its own right, including the very “art” of the image itself. Tertullian then states: “and we [Christians] may hold it as a thing beyond all doubt, that for us who have twice renounced all idols [i.e., idolatry in any of its forms, as itemized above], they are utterly unsuitable.” Again, the thing of primary importance here is the underlying assumption—the paradigm—that allows Irenaeus to make categorical statements regarding the use of images. Sungenis has instead focused only on the immediate application.

R. Sungenis: One thing IS absolutely clear: Svendsen has had the opportunity to prove his case, but he has not. As it stands, he has referred to a grand total of seven Fathers (I did not address Lanctantius because the explanation is the same for him as it is for Arnobius and Athenagoras). First, of those seven Fathers, all of them can be shown to disprove Svendsen's case rather than prove it. Second, there are over one hundred church Fathers the Church looks to for its "unanimous consent," so even if the seven Fathers Svendsen presented were to go against the consensus, the unanimity would be the same, since the Church does not define "unanimous consent" as including every single Father, but the overwhelming majority of Fathers. In effect, the fact that Svendsen has so little to prove his case, shows that Trent was indeed correct in saying that the verdict from the Fathers was unanimous.

I think, by any fair standard, it has rather been shown that Sungenis’ treatment of these writers is exceedingly shallow, going no deeper than the words themselves and completely ignoring the underlying assumptions that must be true of these writers in order for them to have written such statements. Once again we have been treated to an example of how Roman Catholic apologetics works. The goal of Roman Catholic apologetics seems to be simply “to give an answer.” It matters not that your answer obfuscates the point, is irrational, is internally inconsistent with your other beliefs, and is not well argued. What matters is that you’ve given an appearance of a response.

 In addition to his inability to overturn the previous points I have made about these patristic writers, Sungenis has not provided us with any contrary evidence from the “over one hundred church Fathers the Church looks to for its ‘unanimous consent.’” Is there evidence from this era (viz., primarily 2^nd century) that shows a contrary view? We don’t know because Sungenis has not bothered to present it. What we do know from this is that Trent—and, consequently, Sungenis—is wrong about the “unanimous consent of the fathers.” The word “unanimous” means “being in complete harmony or accord,” “characterized by complete assent or agreement.” That implies no dissent. We have more than enough evidence—and no contrary evidence that Sungenis has bothered to present—to show that the earliest fathers rejected the use of images in the life and practice of the church.

Moreover, one is struck by the complete lack of precedent in Scripture of anyone known to be in good standing with God bowing down to a statue of anything, whether of a god or a "non god." Sungenis opened his article by insisting that "Scripture considers bowing before an image that represents God or false god as an act of worship. Worship can only be given to a divine being, whether actual or presupposed divinity." Such a statement suggests that to bow down before an image that you know is not a representation of a "god" is biblically acceptable. Daniel's companions, Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego may have been a bit surprised by that revelation. In Daniel 2, Nebuchadnezzar has a dream of an image, which Daniel interprets as representing four major powers coming upon the earth, and indicates that the "gold" part of the image represents the king himself: "in your hands he has placed mankind and the beasts of the field and the birds of the air. Wherever they live, he has made you ruler over them all. You are that head of gold" (v. 38). Daniel even honors the king by saying of him, "You, O king, are the king of kings. The God of heaven has given you dominion and power and might and glory" (2:37). As a result of all this, the king makes an image of "gold" (3:1), representing his--and only his--role in the dream, and gives the order that all peoples should bow down to the image and pay it "homage" (Heb, segid; 3:5).

I'll pause here momentarily to point out that Roman Catholic apologists have gone on record stating that veneration of the saints in no different than the ancient practice of bowing down before a civil magistrate--a king, ruler, governor, and the like. According to them, it would have been biblically acceptable for God's people to bow before and pay homage to this image since they knew the image represented the king whom Daniel had previously acknowledged as "the king of kings" (2:37). Yet, oddly, Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego refused to fall down before the image (3:16-18). Being Daniel's companions, they surely would have known that the image represented the king. They surely would have no objection to bowing down before what they knew, after all, to be an image of a "non god" civil magistrate who was worthy of their honor. Yet, so repugnant to them was the notion of bowing down to a statue, that they refused and opted instead to face death (3:17, 20).

Robert Sungenis has placed himself in the unenviable position of having to defend a practice that not only has no biblical precedent, but is biblically characterized as repugnant. Moreover, he has no support for this practice from the earliest years of Christianity. Indeed, the "unanimous consent" of the early church seems to speak with one voice against the practice. If later patristic writers decided to adopt this practice, it does not make the practice any more biblical or any less repugnant. Worshiping at the "high places" in ancient Israel was no less despicable before God just because it happened to gain wide support from the Jewish leaders. Sungenis, and Roman Catholicism as a whole, is simply repeating the same errors of ancient Israel. Like ancient Israel, Roman Catholicism has adopted traditions that not only "nullify the word of God," but have crossed over into blatant idolatry.

Eric Svendsen, Ph.D.